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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
MARY BUZIANIS,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

.

vs.

CASE NO.

14257

•

BENEFICIAL HOMES, INC./ a
Utah Corporation, and RON
GIBB,

:

Defendants-Appellants,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Beneficial Homes, Inc. and Ronald Gibb

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought to enforce a promissory note
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
At trial the defendants furnished evidence in the form
of checks in attempt to prove that certain payments had
been made against the promissory note. The trial court
determined that the defendant was to receive credit for
some of the checks but not others. The trial court
awarded judgment to the plaintiffs in the amount of
$5,500.00 plus $1,081.35 interest plus court costs of
$37.80 and attorneys fees in the sum of $2,227.11.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants-appellants seek a reversal of the judgment
entered by the trial court on July 31, 1975 on the grounds
that evidence was erroneously excluded at trial. That the
judgment failed to give the defendants credit for a check
which had been admitted at trial. That the defendantsappellants should not be bound by the terms of the Stipulation entered into at trial and that the award of attorneys
fees were not supported by fact and were unreasonable under
the circumstances.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about January 14, 1971, parties entered into a promissory
note wherein defendant, Ronald Gibb, agreed to pay plaintiff the amount
of $7,500.00. The payments were to be made at the rate of $500.00 per
lot when sold.
Plaintiff filed suit against the defendants in March of 197 4
alleging that defendants owed the amount of $6,681.35 on the above
described promissory note.
At trial the parties entered into a stipulation presented to
the Court which apparently provided that judgment would be granted
against the defendant as prayed in the Complaint but that it would not
be entered until July 14th.(Tr.2). Defendants were given until July
14th to prove they were entitled to credit for amounts already paid on
the promissory note.(Tr.2). Defendant-appellant, Ron Gibb, is a layman
and appeared as his own counsel at trial.
On July 14, 1975 the defendant appeared in Court and presented
the evidence that certain payments had been made. The plaintiffs admitted that they had received a payment of $500.00 on May 20, 1971, another check for $500.00 on April 20, 1971 and an additional payment on
the same date for $500.00. Plaintiffs further admitted that on the
14th of September, 1971, they received a payment from the defendants in
the amount of $2,139.00.(Tr.2,3). Defendant-appellant presented other
evidence of payment which were not received by the Court. One cashiers
check for $1,000.00 marked subdivision #3 was not admitted into evidence
because subdivision #4 was the subdivision in dispute.(Tr.3,4). The
defendant proferred to show that the check should have been credited to
Subdivision #4. Mr. Gibb had disbursement records showing that the .
check which was marked Subdivision #3 was actually applied to Subdivision #4.(Tr. 4,5).
The Court stated at trial that the burden of proof was on
the defendant-appellant at the July 14, 1975 hearing.(Tr.4).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDED DEFENDANT'S
EVIDENCE ON DAMAGES,
Defendant was advised by the Court tha<- .,* «<ir\ *-• produce
evidence of any payments or par t:i a ] paymei 1 t: madtiff.(Tr.3).

A t a 1 ater h e a r i n g the d e f e n d a n t a t t e m p t e d t

ev:i d e n c e that c h e c k s d r a w n o n Benef i ci al H o m e s , AIK. . wer*-

Lh\/oduco
i

; -

uhe

p l a i n t i f f and t h a t n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the r e f e r e n c e on sa^r

tcc/.

S u b d i v i s i o n #3 tl lat said c h e c k s shoul d h a v e b e e n crediteu

. 3>,uii-

visi on II I

) .

'r

•.'

:.o

' •

Defendant suggested that if the p a y m e n t were not made to
plaintiff toi

Subdivision f}4

< /It<il were

i

v

p^.J :or? (Tr ,4)

Court responded that ' ' t:l: le bur dei :i i s oi I y<

••

••

:

• ••

- «•

e go t: to si: 10

This again reflected the effect o: the ut-ra-atiu.
tl ie

:1

'"

reared, into **y

••

*1 y p] aced npoi i

the defendant.
The court di d not accept d e f e n d a n t s reasoning.
attempted I :o si : :)v ;; 1 .1 l a I 1 i E; 1 if i,<:I I ; ; •• : c;l :i sbi urr*

?

He then

>ks an: id I: .1 la I: I .1 i =

• c h e c k s m a r k e d S u b d i v i s i o n #3 w e r e actually d r a w n on d i s b u r s e m e n t Subd i v i s i o n #4.(T i : „ 5,6,7&8)
Tl ie Coi i r t: r e \fused

I; : ei ;:<: uiti n< i i s a i I Subdi i/:i si oi I 1 Dooks .

The

Court continued by stating that "the checks might have been for an
automobile as iar as i kiiow."(Tr. 5 ) .
The evidence concerning the

-

^.j/vusij: disbursement

books prof erred by the defendant were _._: admitted •
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trial Court.

The effect of this ruling was that in spite of the fact that such
payments had been made to the plaintiff, and despite the fact that
plaintiff had not demonstrated the checks were indeed not to be
credited to the account in dispute, defendant was placed in the
unfortunate position of having to prove a negative, ie. that the
checks to the plaintiff were not in payment for an automobile or
whatever as suggested by the trial court.

This again reflects the

effect of the shift and the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the
defendant.

The defendant produced checks that were paid to and

cashed by the plaintiff but was not allowed credit for them.

The

inequitable result was that the plaintiff received the checks and
additionally took judgment for the same amount and was thus unjustly
enriched*
It is important to note that no formal objection was ever
made to the evidence concerning the two Subdivision disbursement
books furnished by the defendant.

Further, if the defendant could

have demonstrated that the checks marked subdivision #3 were actually
drawn for and in payment on subdivision #4 the evidence was certainly
relevent to the material issues in the lawsuit.

In view of these facts

the evidence should have been admitted and the courts ruling on this
evidence was erroneous.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE DEFENDANT CREDIT FOR A
CHECK FOR $2,139.00 WHICH WAS ENTERED INTO EVIDENCE
AT TRIAL.
At the trial on July 14, 1975 the plaintiff admitted receiving a check from the defendant dated September 14, 1971 in the amount
of $2,139.00. The plaintiff admitted that he had received the check
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
and that it wasDigitized
thebypayment
on Subdivision #4.
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Notwithstanding this admission by the plaintiff, when the
courts final findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed the
Court stated that check No. 1212 in the amount of $2,139.00 was a
down payment and had been previously credited to the defendants
prior to the execution of the note on which they sued.

This finding

of fact was contrary to uncontroverted evidence that that check was
a payment on Subdivision #4 and the plaintiff admitted receiving
that as such payment.

Further, said check was dated September 14, 1971

(Tr. 3), which was nine months after the promissory note was executed.
(Exhibit A attached to Complaint).
It was error not to give defendant credit for the amount of
$2,139.00.
POINT III.
THE STIPULATION BETWEEN PLAINTIFFfS COUNSEL AND DEFENDANT ACTING AS HIS OWN COUNSEL WAS VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS,
UNREASONABLE AND AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.
At the commencement of the trial below, plaintiff's counsel
and defendant, acting as his own attorney, entered into a stipulation
which was presented to the Court.

Defendant is a layman.

In present-

ing the stipulation to the Court, plaintiff's counsel stated:
"Our stipulation, Your Honor, is that the plaintiff
is to have judgment against the defendants Beneficial
Homes and Ron Gibb in the amounts prayed for according
to the prayer thereof with the stipulation that judgement be granted against the defendant for and until
July the 14th, 1975, during which time if the defendants can produce documentation that they are Entitled
to a credit as against that amount prayed for they
should be granted that credit and judgment taken for
that amount, if any; otherwise judgment will be entered on July the 14th for the full amount provided
that no documentation is presented by the defendants.
(Tr. 2) .
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The stipulation was later clarified to mean that judgment
would not be entered until July 14, 197 5.

However, even with that

clarification, the terms of the agreement are virtually incomprehensible, particularly concerning credit to be granted and how much
judgment would be taken.
The principal deficiency of the stipulation, however, is
that it was unreasonable and against public policy.

It was unreason-

able in that the plaintiff gave up nothing but received great benefit
from the stipulation.

The stipulation relieved the plaintiff of

proving her case, that the defendant owed her money.

For his efforts,

the defendant was given the burden of proving that he had made payments
to the plaintiff.

The effect of the stipulation was to shift the bur-

den of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant.

By analogy to con-

tract law, the stipulation was without consideration on the part of
the plaintiff for she gave up nothing of value.

s

It is elementary that a plaintiff seeking redress in the
Courts has the burden of proving he is entitled to such redress.
Like the defendant in a criminal case who is presumed innocent until
proven guilty, the defendant in a civil case is presumed not to be
indebted to the plaintiff until the plaintiff proves otherwise.

The

effect of the stipulation in this case was to deprive the defendant
of this presumption and was contrary to the policy reasons supporting this fundamental principal of law.
Still another but equally serious defect of the stipulation
is that it is extremely doubtful that the defendant, a layman, understood the terms or the effect of the stipulation.

The record is

void of any indication that either plaintiff's counsel or the Court
Digitized byor
the Howard
W. Hunter
Library, stipulation.
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
explained the terms
effect
ofLawthe
The stipulation
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was presented in confusing and contradictory language. (Tr.2).
Whereupon, the Court asked the defendant if that was his agreement.
(TR.2).

It was not explained that the burden of proof, which in

this case did indeed turn out to be a burden, would be shifted from
the plaintiff to defendant.
In the case of Deseret Sav. Bank v. Walker, 78 Utah 241,
2P. 2d 609(1931) this Court had the opportunity to examine a stipulation entered into by a layman.

The Court concluded that the

stipulation was effective and should be construed in the light of
the allegations and admissions .in the pleadings because the layman
was a man of affairs with business experience and, "Nothing is made
to appear that he was either ignorant or inexperienced or that any
advantage was taken of him, or that he did not fully comprehend the
full meaning of his stipulation and the implications necessarily
arising therefrom".

This language infers that if it appeared that

the stipulant was ignorant or inexperienced or that he was taken
advantage of or did not comprehend the stipulation or its implications, the Court would not have enforced the stipulation.
These are precisely the conditions that were present in the
present case.

Defendant was inexperienced in the law as evidenced

by his entering into the stipulation in the first place and by his
lack of understanding of procedure and rules of evidence.(Tr.2,5,6).

-7-
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He was also probably taken advantage of although the discussions
concerning the terms of the stipulation were off the record.

But

it is unlikely that he would stipulate away his rights if he had
been explained the ramifications of such action.
It is respectfully submitted that defendant should not
have been bound by his stipulation.
POINT IV.
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES OF $2,227.11 WERE NOT
SUPPORTED BY FACTS AND WERE UNREASONABLE.
Plaintiff's counsel filed a Complaint and made threevery
brief court appearances in this case on June 9, 197 5, July 14, 197 5
and July 21, 1975. For these services, plaintiff was awarded
$2,227.11 for attorney's fees.
No evidence was presented as to attorney's fees such as
what services were rendered or how much time was involved.
The parties did stipulate as to judgment but as suggested
above, the stipulation is unenforceable.

But even if it were a

valid stipulation, the terms are vague and confusing.

Plaintiff's

counsel represented it as stating judgment would be granted as
prayed and plaintiff did pray for attorney's fees of $2,227.11.
But, the stipulation itself does not mention attorney's fees.

It

is apparent that the judgment referred to in the stipulation was a
judgment for the amount claimed by plaintiff because the amount
prayed for was to be credited if defendant could present certain
documentation.

No documentation could have any effect on the prayer

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for attorney's fees.

Thus the stipulation only concerned the

amount claimed owing or defendant was led to believe it did.
Since the parties did not agree on the amount of
attorney's fees, the Court was obliged to take evidence on the
issue of the reasonableness of the attorney's fees which it
did not do.

F.M.A. Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc.17 Utah

2d 80,404P.2d 670(1965); Provo City Corporation v. Cropper, 28
Utah 2d. 1,497P. 2d 629(1972); Freed Finance Company v. Stoker
Motor Company,

Utah 2d,

, 537P. 2d. 1039(1975).

Assuming for sake of argument that the parties did
stipulate as to attorney's fees, the court nonetheless had the
obligation to examine reasonableness thereof.
The attorney's fees were unsupported by evidence and in
any event were unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
The trial court excluded presumably relevant evidence
without objection which was proffered by the defendant Ron
Gibb to demonstrate that he had made payments for which he
had not received credit.

Defendants were not given credit for

a payment of $2,139.00 which plaintiffs admitted receiving.
Defendant Gibb unknowingly entered into a stipulation that
was confusing at best and unreasonable.

The stipulation had

the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the defendants.
Finally, attorneys' fees were awarded the plaintiff which were
not supported by evidence and in any event were unreasonable.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of
the trial court should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^

day of February,

1976.

E. Nordell Weeks

Ted Boyer

2^_V

MCMILLAN AND BROWNING
102 0 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
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